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STUDENT COMMENTS
LABOR ARBITRATION AND ANTI-INJUNCTION:
THE CASE FOR ACCOMMODATION
I. INTRODUCTION: THE New Orleans Steamship CASE'
The collective bargaining agreement signed by the New Orleans Steam-
ship Association and the General Longshore Workers, I.L.A. Local 1418
contained a no-strike clause, an arbitration clause providing for quick, final
and binding arbitration, and a clause empowering the arbitrator to issue
a desist order.2
 A dispute arose between the management and the union
concerning alleged work stoppages. The matter was submitted to binding
arbitration according to the terms of the agreement. The arbitrator, having
found that the work stoppages were in violation of the contract, issued an
order directing the union to cease and desist from work stoppages. 3
When, according to the management, work stoppages continued, the
company brought suit in the federal district court for an order enforcing the
award of the arbitrator. The district court dismissed the complaint,4 relying
upon the Norris-LaGuardia Act.' and Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 43 where
the Supreme Court had held that federal courts may not enjoin strikes in
breach of no-strike clauses. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers Local 1418, 7
reversed, and held that a federal court may, by an affirmative order, grant
enforcement of an arbitrator's desist order against violations of a no-strike
clause where the arbitrator is specifically granted such power in the contract.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari.8
I New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers Local 1418, 389 F.2d 369
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
2 393 F.2d at 370.
3 Id. The agreement provided that "the arbitrator shall make findings of fact con-
cerning the alleged violation and shall prescribe appropriate relief, including an order to
desist therefrom." The parties interpreted this language as empowering the arbitrator
to enjoin work stoppages and therefore did not dispute the jurisdiction of the arbitrator
over the subject matter. Id. at 371.
4
 Id. at 369.
5
 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 -15 (1964).
Section 4 provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restrain-
ing order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or grow-
ing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment . . .
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
6 370 U.S. 195, 203 (1962).
7 389 F.2d 369 (5th Or. 1960.
8 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
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In its decision, the court of appeals was required to resolve two basic
questions. First, whether the situation presented fell within the Supreme Court's
decision in Sinclair or the circuit court's own opinion in Gulf & South Amer-
ican S.S. Co. v. National Maritime Union,9 and secondly, whether the pro-
hibition of the Norris-LaGuardia Act against injunctions applied to the case.
After responding in the negative to each of these questions, the court pro-
ceeded to make the policy-oriented decision in favor of enforcement. This
policy determination undoubtedly signals the possibility of a significant ex-
pansion of the power of the arbitrator in the no-strike area. However, before
this possibility may be realistically assessed, it is necessary to examine the
court's resolution of the applicability of prior case law and of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.
In Gulf & South American the court held that absent power or jurisdic-
tion in the arbitrator, which can originate only from the agreement of the
parties, there can be no judicial enforcement of his award." In that case
the court found that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority in making
the award because the no-strike question was not arbitrable per se and thus
could not alone serve as a basis for the arbitrator's jurisdiction to order the
union to cease the work stoppage.il The distinguishing feature of the New
Orleans case, according to the court, was that the arbitrator was specifically
authorized to resolve the work stoppage issue. Thus, Gulf presented no bar
to enforcement of the award in the instant case.
In Sinclair, again, the Supreme Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act applied to prohibit federal courts from enjoining strikes concededly in
violation of no-strike clauses, even where the contract contained an arbitra-
tion provision. However, as the court in New Orleans indicated," Sinclair did
not involve an arbitration award, the suit having been brought before the
dispute had been arbitrated. In New Orleans, on the other hand, the breach
itself had been the subject of final and binding arbitration, consistent with
the agreement of the parties. On the basis of this factual distinction the
court concluded that Sinclair was not controlling." A second reason for dis-
tinguishing Sinclair rested, according to the court, "on the more than seman-
tical ground that there is a real difference between an ordinary injunction
and an order enforcing the award of an arbitrator although the end result
is the same."14
This latter argument had been advanced earlier by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291.15 There the court avoided the proscription of
9 360 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1966).
19 Id. at 65.
11 Id.
12 389 F.2d at 371.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 372.
15 365 F.2d 295 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 64 (1967). The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Teamsters Local 795 v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345
(10th Cir. 1960), had also delineated between an injunctive decree for a negative pur-
pose and an affirmative order enforcing the agreement of the parties. However, this
899
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the Norris-LaGuardia Act by reasoning that it was not issuing an injunction
nor what it considered a restraining order, but rather an affirmative order
calling upon the defendant union for specific performance of the arbitration
award." The Supreme Court, relying on Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,'' reversed the case because of the imprecision of the court's
order." In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas questioned the ad-
visability of the court's dismissal of the case on this ground for the reason
that if the district court's order was an "injunction" within the meaning of
Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules, it would also appear to be an "injunction"
within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Viewing the situation pre-
sented in Philadelphia Marine in this light, district courts would consider
Sinclair controlling."
If a valid distinction exists between an injunction and an affirmative
order, it is extremely difficult to conceptualize. While the courts mentioned
above have recognized such a distinction, others have not been able to appre-
ciate it.2° The commentators are also divided on the question; some claim that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act includes only negative prohibitions,'' while others
contend that such a distinction is one without a difference. 22 It is submitted
that if there is a distinction between an injunction and an affirmative order,
it. is of itself insufficient ground upon which to avoid the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Furthermore, it would appear that in those cases adopting the distinction,
the resolution of the issue whether the proscriptions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act should apply to a particular situation was essentially policy motivated,
with the subsequent rationalization that the order was not an injunction em-
ployed simply as a means to effectuate that policy determination. With this
assumption in mind, it seems at least arguable that when the court distin-
guished Sinclair on the basis of the difference between an injunction and an
affirmative order enforcing an arbitrator's award, just as when in Gulf &
South American it did not recognize the distinction on the facts of that case, 23
decision was reversed per curiam by the Supreme Court, citing Sinclair, 370 U.S. 711
(1962).
18 365 F.2d at 301.
17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) states, in pertinent part:
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth
the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reason-
able detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or
acts sought to be restrained... .
18 389 U.S. 64, 73-74, 76 (1967).
19 Id. at 77. Since it is evident that the majority did not wish to reach the question
presented by Sinclair, it seems that Justice Douglas' conclusion was unwarranted. Pos-
sibly he was overstating his case for the purpose of emphasis.
20 See, e.g., Marine Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Curran, 65 L.R.R.M. 2095 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) ; Commercial Can Corp. v. Local 810, Steel Fabricators, 61 N.J. Super. 369, 160
A.2r1 855 (App. Div. 1960).
21 See, e.g., Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 Mich. L. Rev.
673, 682-83 (1961).
22 See, e.g., Rice, A Paradox of Our National Labor Law, 34 Marg. L. Rev. 233,
246 (1951).
23 That decision [Sinclair] .	 . is direct authority on the question and is
controlling. There the employer sought the injunction directly while here the
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the court was implicitly concluding that the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act does not apply once the dispute has been arbitrated.
Having distinguished the prior cases, the court was still faced with the
broad provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act itself. The force of this statute
did not apply to the New Orleans case, according to the court, because the
instant controversy was outside the scope of a labor dispute as such. 24 In
other words, "labor dispute," as used in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, does
not include a grievance which has been processed through binding arbitration
consistent with the terms of a contract providing for arbitration of all disputes
in lieu of self-help remedies. 2' One commentator has urged a similar inter-
pretation on the theory that in 1932, when the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
passed, the only labor disputes contemplated were "battles of industrial war-
fare," not divergent views of the terms and administration of collective bar-
gaining agreements. 26 Along similar lines, another commentator argues that
"[j]udges who still confuse violations of collective bargaining agreements
with § 13 labor disputes and § 4 conduct have . . . lost contact with reality." 27
A third argues that to view a strike in breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment as a labor dispute is to foster the incongruity that "legislation designed
to equip unions with bargaining power should free them to breach an agree-
ment reached by virtue of the same legislation." 29 All three of these conten-
tions were acknowledged, and rejected, by the majority in the Sinclair case. 29
The majority opinion in that case insisted that a strike in breach of a no-
strike clause is a labor disPute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act." However, one must not lose sight of the fact that the Sinclair case did
not concern an arbitration award. 31 The Court has not yet decided whether
a labor dispute which has gone through arbitration has in fact experienced
such a metamorphosis that it is no longer a "labor dispute" within the mean-
ing of Section 13 of the Act. The New Orleans court felt that arbitration had
this cathartic effect. It is submitted, however, that the interpretation of "labor
dispute" is also, in the last analysis, a policy decision. This position finds
support in the Sinclair majority opinion, dismissing the definition of "labor
dispute" offered by the authors cited above on the ground that these writers
injunction is sought under the guise of enforcing the award of an arbitrator
but this is a distinction without a difference under the facts of this case, and
any other result would be exalting form over substance.
360 F.2d at 65.
24 389 F.2d at 372.
25 "We have before us a contract wherein the parties have ceded their remedy of
self-help in a labor dispute to arbitration even to the point of permitting the arbitrator
to grant a desist order." Id.
28 "So, I submit, 'labor dispute' means only the sort of labor controversy for which
the parties have not framed a rule or a way of achieving a settlement." Rice, supra
note 22, at 250.
27 Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 635, 645-46
n.39 (1959).
28 Stewart, supra note 21, at 678.
20 370 U.S. at 201-02 & n.12.
3° Id. at 200.
31 Id. at 197.
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were expounding labor policy as they thought it should be, rather than as
Congress had established it. 32
Even if a different interpretation of "injunction" does not provide a
self-sufficient ground upon which to distinguish Sinclair, the factual distinc-
tion provided by the existence of the arbitration award in New Orleans is
undoubtedly significant. Since the arbitration process is reputed to be the
instrument to replace industrial strife," then strikes before and after arbitra-
tion are essentially different. For this reason, Sinclair does not necessarily
control the situation of a strike in violation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment and an arbitrator's desist order. 34
 However, a court seeking to enjoin a
strike, after distinguishing Sinclair, must then proceed to the more important
issue of the Norris-LaGuardia Act itself. A narrow construction of "labor
dispute" enabled the New Orleans court to skirt this statute. The court viewed
labor disputes before arbitration as essentially different once processed through
contractual arbitration. This argument is hardly compelling, for both before
and after arbitration labor and management may be in dispute over an
issue. However, where the parties have agreed to submit alleged violations
of a no-strike clause to arbitration, and have expressly given the arbitrator
power to grant a desist order against the strike, they may realistically be
taken as having agreed to end strikes in violation of their contract and to
replace them with arbitration. This creation of private judicial processes by
the parties does, arguably, provide a basis upon which to ground avoidance
of the literal proscriptions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. At the same time,
however, the prospect of automatic enforcement of these private judicial
processes by the courts presents the ultimate issue of the weight to be given
the anti-injunction policy underlying the statute.
The underlying and determinative factor in the New Orleans decision,
it would appear, was the policy determination that the court should restrict,
rather than extend, the sweep of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Implicit in the
New Orleans opinion are two judgments made sub silentio by the court:
(1) judicial enforcement of awards is necessary for effective arbitration;
(2) the court is simply enforcing a contractual agreement of the parties.
These two conclusions underlay the affirmative response to the question
whether policy considerations dictated the granting of enforcement in this
situation.
The court cited Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act,35
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mi11s," 6 and the Steelworkers' Trilogy"
for the proposition that the congressional and judicial policy is to foster the
arbitration process. Moreover, federal courts may compel parties to collective
32 Id. at 200-02.
33 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960);
Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice Looks at Arbitration, 20 Arb. J. 13, 14 (1965).
34 See Isaacson, The Grand Equation: Labor Arbitration and the No-Strike Clause,
48 A.B.A.J. 914, 918 (1962).
35 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
36 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
37 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S, 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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bargaining contracts to carry out their agreements to arbitrate," and will
enforce arbitration awards up to the point of those matters proscribed by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act." In this case, since the court had determined
that the matter was not a "labor dispute" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
the court felt that it must enforce the award to be consistent with the policy
favoring arbitration, as enforcement, practically speaking, was the last step
in the arbitration process. In this latter regard, the court stated: "We think
the logic of the arbitration policy compels this result; otherwise one of the
parties to a collective bargaining agreement containing arbitration and no
strike or work stoppage clauses has a hollow right indeed." 40 The sentiment
expressed in this statement, that arbitration becomes ineffective unless duly
arbitrated work stoppages can be enjoined, was dismissed by the Court in
Sinclair as insufficient reason to override the proscription of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act:
The argument to the contrary seems to rest upon the notion that
injunctions against peaceful strikes are necessary to make the arbi-
tration process effective. But whatever might be said about the merits
of this argument, Congress has itself rejected it. In so doing, it set
the limit to which it was willing to go in permitting courts to effec-
tuate the congressional policy favoring arbitration and it is not this
Court's business to review the wisdom of that decision 41
In light of the fact that in Sinclair a prior arbitration award was not
before the Court, this statement is arguably dicta. The Supreme Court has
not yet considered whether enforcement of an arbitrator's injunction is
necessary to insure the efficacy of the arbitration process. Because there are
a number of divergent views on the question, 42
 and because the issue itself
is so important, it is submitted that the Supreme Court should not allow this
dicta to be controlling, but rather should decide the'exact question in its fac-
tual context. Undoubtedly, little can be read into a denial of certiorari, but
from the the mere fact that the New Orleans case was not reversed it is at
least arguable that the Court is reconsidering its interpretation in Sinclair of
the meaning of congressional inactivity on the question of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act and arbitration. Congress has not responded to the Sinclair deci-
sion, and it has been suggested that because of the large body of federal law
the courts have fashioned in the area it is not likely to do so." Thus the
38 Id.
39 See, e.g., Minute Maid Co. v. Citrus & Cannery Workers, Drivers Local 444, 331
F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Employees' Local 255,
328 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1964).
4° 389 F.2d at 372.
41 370 U.S. at 213.
42 See, e.g., Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv. L.
Rev. 999, 1024 (1955) (suggesting that the law stay out of arbitrable disputes) ; Sinclair
Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 216 (1962) (dissenting opinion) (noting that court
enforcement may be necessary for effective arbitration).
43 1964-1965 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev.
815, 834 (1965). On September 25, 1967, Sen. Paul Fannin introduced a bill, S. 2455, "to
amend the Norris-LaGuardia Act so as to permit the granting of injunctive relief in suits
brought to enforce the provisions of contracts between employers and labor organiza-
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policy determination of the application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act will
likely be made by the Court. Until a final pronouncement on the question is
made by the Supreme Court, however, each court faced with enforcing an
arbitrator's injunction must decide for itself the policy which it wishes to
favor. This situation certainly does not promote uniformity in the Iaw. It also
allows the social and economic beliefs and prejudices of the different courts
to play a large part in an area where such license previously had led to abuse.
The court in New Orleans also buttressed its decision with the argument
that by enforcing the arbitrator's award it did nothing more than carry out
the agreement of the parties." The court emphasized that the parties had
voluntarily agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration and had granted the
arbitrator injunctive power. Furthermore, the court indicated that the union's
contention in the face of the suit in the district court was simply that the
court lacked jurisdiction to remedy the breach:" Implicit in these statements
is the reasoning that an obvious inequity would result if the union were to
escape its voluntary agreements. This appreciation of the equities proved
decisive of the issue in at least two other cases where arbitrators' injunctions
were enforced. One case, Ruppert v. Egelltoffer,46 was decided by a state
court; the other, New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers Local
1418,47 by the district court which had refused enforcement in the instant
case. In commenting upon these two decisions, one writer sought to capsule
the reasoning of the courts:
[I inasmuch as the parties had, by their collective bargaining agree-
ment, authorized the arbitrator to grant a cease and desist order
against work stoppages in violation of their contract, the respective
anti-injunction acts in each jurisdiction did not preclude a state or
federal court from enforcing the arbitrator's order since the parties
themselves, and not the court, has sanctioned the remedy."
The court of appeals in New Orleans appeared to adopt this reasoning. It
viewed the matter as simply one of contract and, since damages were inade-
quate, it felt compelled to order specific performance. This reasoning would
seem to overlook an important distinction. An action for specific performance
will lie if money damages are not adequate," yet before a court will issue an
injunction it must generally be satisfied that stricter and more comprehensive
equity safeguards are met. 5° The failure to draw this distinction, and con-
tions." The bill was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Sen. Fannin (for himself and Sen. Goldwater) reintroduced the
same bill, now known as S. 1482, on March IA, 1969. Once again the bill was read twice
and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. 91st Cong., 1st Sess. ('1969).
44 389 F.2d at 372.
45 Id. at 371.
46 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958).
47 49 L.R.R.M. 2941 (1962).
48 Spelfogel, Enforcement of No-Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Actions and
Discipline, 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 239, 250 (1966).
49 "The essential foundation of the jurisdiction to entertain a bill for the specific
performance of a contract is the inadequacy of the remedy at law for its breach." Hazel-
ton v. Miller, 25 App. D.C. 337, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1905).
5 ° Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
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centration upon the contractual nature of the court's remedy, thus presents
the possibility that the traditional requirements of equitable relief will be
relaxed.
It therefore becomes important to analyze the effects of the New
Orleans decision and rationale with an eye to the policy underlying the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. The following analysis will isolate three paths of de-
velopment open to the law after New Orleans: (1) a rejection of Sinclair and
complete affirmation of New Orleans; (2) a compromise position, a middle
ground as it were, between Sinclair and New Orleans; and (3) a complete
rejection of New Orleans and extension of Sinclair into the arbitration area.
II. AFFIRMATION OF New Orleans
The conclusion that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar enforce-
ment of arbitrators' strike injunctions, in light of the limited review of
arbitrators' awards allowed the courts by the Steelworkers' Trilogy,'" would
seem to result in automatic judicial enforcement of an arbitrator's cease and
desist order. Furthermore, if a court considers the question simply as a mat-
ter of contract, then enforcenient is not discretionary but rather peremptory,
because this is the remedy to which the parties have agreed. Thus, judicial
affirmation of the New Orleans case would mark labor arbitration as having
indeed come of age. The grievance and arbitration procedure could then
truly be said to be a private judicial system established by agreement of the
parties. At this point, it would seem that arbitration of the scope of that in
New Orleans would effectively replace economic warfare in labor disputes.
Committed as it now is to the arbitration process, management would cer-
tainly welcome this result since it insures uninterrupted production.
Since management is desirous of the end reached in the New Orleans
decision, it will undoubtedly imitate the means through which this result
was attained, namely, the specific provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement enabling the court to decide as it did. Thus, one would expect
a number of labor-management contracts to include, along with the now
traditional no-strike clause, a provision providing for quick, final and binding
arbitration, and a clause empowering the arbitrator to issue a desist order.
In view of the court's emphasis of this latter provision,52 the express grant
of injunctive power to the arbitrator would seem to be a sine qua non for
judicial enforcement. However, the New York court in Ruppert implied the
same from the general tenor of the contract."
The contract in New Orleans had a "Dispute Procedure and Arbitra-
tion" provision stressing celerity in grievance settlement. By the terms of
this provision, the parties accepted "the principle that any dispute involving
the interpretation or application of the terms of this agreement shall be re-
solved in an orderly and expeditious manner." 54 Step 1 of the procedure
51 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
52 389 F.2d at 372.
53 3 N.Y.2d at 581, 148 N.E.2d at 130, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
54 389 F.2d at 370.
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called for immediate discussion between appropriate representatives of the
employer and the local union when a problem arose. If a settlement were
not reached either party could request immediate referral to the next level.
Step 2 brought the problem before a permanent disputes committee. If this
committee did not resolve the point in dispute within 48 hours ("or within
such additional time mutually agreed upon"), 55 the dispute would be taken
to final and binding arbitration. This roundabout route to arbitration could
be curtailed because either party to the dispute could by-pass the procedure
leading up to arbitration and obtain arbitration immediately upon allegation
of a violation of the no-strike or no-Iockout clause. 56
The arbitration process itself also mirrored the parties' interest in quick
settlement. A panel of six permanent arbitrators had been selected by the
parties for the duration of the agreement. 57 The arbitrator would be notified
by telegram and would hold a hearing within 72 hours after receipt of notice.
The award would be rendered within 12 hours after the hearing. Quick resolu-
tion of a problem is ordinarily welcomed by both sides because, generally,
neither labor .nor management wishes to halt the wheels of production. In
most cases, too, the arbitrator's decision is accepted as final. 58 Furthermore,
if the New Orleans decision is followed, voluntary acceptance will become
even more commonplace because both sides will know court enforcement is
obtainable. However, one can expect an occasion to arise when a party will
disregard the award, and, as here, the union might continue its work stop-
pages or its strike. In this situation the quick arbitration procedure is un-
availing if there is not also a quick judicial disposition of the confirma-
tion and enforcement of the award. Presumably, summary judgment would
suffice,5° but even that procedure might give a recalcitrant union sufficient
leverage to wring from management the concession which it was not willing
to yield in the bargaining sessions. To avoid this problem the labor bar can
be expected to attempt acceleration of the judicial process of enforcement by
agreement of the parties. One possibility would appear to be a provision in
the collective bargaining agreement waiving the statutory time limits for
delivery of the award and for service of notice for confirmation or modification
proceedings, and the substitution of shorter time periods. Another provision
might state that with the application for judicial confirmation within a
designated (short) period of time, the party's right to appeal for modification
of the award would be waived. Still another attempt to hasten court enforce-
ment would be a provision whereby the parties agree that immediate tem-
porary relief may be granted ex parte, that is, temporary enforcement of the
arbitrator's award until a hearing is held and judgment is entered by the
court.




68 See F. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 10 (1952); Rice, supra note 22, at 237.
59 See, e.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Employees' Local 255, 328 F.2d 310




contracts, the more serious question remains whether the courts will accept
them. Courts will not readily appreciate waivers of their procedural rules, and
the mere mention of es parte labor injunctions will surely evoke unpleasant
memories.°" Yet if one accepts the proposition that arbitrators' injunctions
are to be enforced as the remedy to which the parties have agreed, then
little reason remains for delay in requiring the parties to conform to their
own remedy, and therefore little reason not to accept their swift and con-
sensual judicial proceedings. Furthermore, a court viewing the enforcement of
arbitrator's desist orders as necessary for effective arbitration and recognizing
its limited review of arbitration, would appear justified in the enforcement of
the entire agreement of the parties, including their agreement for quick court
processing. Consistency would seem also to require even the acceptance of
agreements to enter ex parte ordersP
Before the New Orleans decision federal courts would not enjoin peaceful
strikes even though they violated arbitrators' awards and collective bargaining
agreements. For this reason, a union signing a no-strike clause did so with the
knowledge that it had only nominally relinquished its most effective economic
weapon. The union would, of course, be subject to a damage suit, but even this
sanction is somewhat softened by the fact that the damage issue is itself
arbitrable.°2 The disciplining of participating employees is an alternative
sanction, but the disciplining itself is also an arbitrable issue." Furthermore,
if the commentators are correct, these two remedies not only do not sufficiently
compensate for the breach, but also do not serve as effective deterrents .° 4 The
most effective deterrent would be knowledge of the availability of judicial
enforcement of the arbitrator's injunction. Future affirmation of New Orleans
would effect this result. At the same time it would seemingly change the
present concept of a no-strike clause. The union's surrender of this weapon at
60 See generally F. Frankfurter Sr N. Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930) .
61 It must be noted, however, that the acceptability of ex parte enforcement pro-
visions may in reality be an illusory problem, for unions are likely to be extremely re-
luctant to agree to such a provision because of their unhappy experience with ex parte
labor injunctions in the past. Unless management occupies a very strong bargaining
position, therefore, an ex parte provision would probably come at such a high price that
insistence on it would be improvident. Waiver of statutory time limits, however, would
seem to be less offensive to unions. On the other hand, this entire process of bringing a
quick end to work stoppages in violation of no-strike clauses may result in reconsideration
of ready acceptance of no-strike clauses by unions.
62 Reading the Steelworkers trilogy, Drake Bakeries 1370 U.S. 254 (1962)1
and the Sinclair cases conjunctively, it is concluded that, unless the collective
bargaining agreement expressly excludes the possibility that the damage issue
shall be subject to arbitration in the event of a contract violation, it will be
deemed arbitrable.
The reason why arbitrability softens the blow is that
courts are generally more liberal in both what will be considered a proper
element of damages and in the amounts awarded. On the other hand, while
most arbitrators appear willing to award an employer provable damages in
some amount for a union's breach of a no-strike contract, arbitrators exhibit a
general reluctance to award substantial damages, even where the union's breach
is open and flagrant.
Spelfogel, supra note 48, at 252, 254,
03 Id. at 255.
64 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 21, at 675; Rice, supra note 22, at 253.
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the bargaining table would be final and literal. For this reason, extension of
the New Orleans decision may be expected to make collective bargaining a
little more difficult because for the first time both labor and management must
assess for themselves the value of the waiver of the right to strike.
III. THE MIDDLE GROUND
An alternative to the New Orleans decision is the view that, although the
Norris-LaGuardia Act should not be interpreted to apply directly to court
enforcement of arbitration awards, the policy behind the statute does have
continuing validity in this setting. Therefore, the matter is not simply a con-
tract action to be handled summarily by the court. Rather, the court should
have discretionary power in the decision whether this particular strike should
be enjoined. This position represents a middle ground between Sinclair and
New Orleans.
Automatic court enforcement of arbitrators' desist orders would seem
to ignore completely the Norris-LaGuardia Act and would be, as the majority
stated in Sinclair, a repeal by implication of a very significant piece of legisla-
tion." Such repeals are not favored in the law generally,e so, a fortiori, they
become even less desirable in the case of a statute "deliberately drafted in
the broadest of terms in order to avoid the danger that it would be narrowed
by judicial construction." 61
 The Act was not only a negative reaction to ex-
cessive judicial injunction of strikes, but also a reaffirmation of the working-
man's right to strike." This policy has not been repudiated by Congress, and
therefore would appear to be an important consideration for a court asked to
enjoin a strike by enforcement of an arbitrator's desist order.
If the courts do ignore the policy behind the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
view their orders simply as specific enforcement of a contract, the result, as
noted, is equitable relief without traditional equity safeguards. Equity power
in the form of injunction is historically an extraordinary remedy.° However,
the labor arbitrator apparently does not view this power as such." Typically
his award takes the form of a mandatory injunction directing a party to do,
or preventing him from carrying out, some specified future act. 71 Thus, in
arbitration, equitable relief is the rule, whereas in the courts it is the exception.
Furthermore, an arbitrator, having injunctive power, faced with a strike in
breach of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement which
65 370 U.S. at 196, 209-10.
66 Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 9, 11 (ED. Pa.
1941) ; Giles v. Dennison, 15 Okla. 55, 62-63, 78 P. 174, 177 (1904).
67
 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 203 (1962).
68 [The individual worker] shall be free from the interference, restraint, or co-
ercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such repre-
sentatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection... .
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1964).
co See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (dicta) ; F.
Frankfurter & N. Greene, The Labor Injunction 47, 52 (1930).
70
 See United Steelworkers v, Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82
(1960) ; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
71




includes a comprehensive grievance and arbitration provision, and viewing
damages as inadequate relief, presumably must enter a desist order. If this
arbitration award is subsequently confirmed by a court which, in the first
place, considers its review as very limited, and secondly, regards its action as
only an order of specific performance, then the result is clearly an abuse of
equity power. This abuse lies in the absence of a considered balancing of
"the employer's need for such an injunction against the harm that might be
inflicted upon legitimate employee activity." 72
This incautious expansion of the equity court's power was illustrated in
Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Iris Constr. Corp." The court there was
called upon to confirm a commercial arbitration award which, in conformity
with the express powers given by the parties to the arbitrators, directed spe-
cific performance of a building contract. The court confirmed the award and
ordered specific performance, stating
[a] nd here we do not even have an equity suit but a motion made
as of right to confirm a completely valid arbitration award conform-
ing in all respects to the express conferral of authority on the arbitra-
tors and meeting all statutory requirements for confirmation.
.	 .	 .
Arbitration is by consent and those who agree to arbitrate
should be made to keep their solemn, written promises."
Protesting this result, the dissenting judge noted a recent case in that
jurisdiction holding that courts would enforce specific performance of an
employment contract "even though a court of equity would not compel a man
to work for another or to continue another in his employment. . . . 775 So,
too, in the instant case the dissent felt that the decision "lends the enforcement
machinery of the courts, to implement specific performance directed by
arbitration that extends beyond any equitable relief which the courts have
heretofore granted. . • ."" Thus, the court was permitting the arbitrator to
order what the courts could not, and yet call upon the courts to enforce his
decree.
A court which does not apply the Norris-LaGuardia Act literally to
arbitration but does give effect to the policy behind that statute is doing no
more than accommodating the Norris-LaGuardia Act with Section 301 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act and its favored policy of arbitration. This
position was urged by Mr. Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in
Sinclair. His dissent rested on the premise that
the enjoining of a strike over an arbitrable grievance may be in-
dispensable to the effective enforcement of an arbitration scheme in
a collective agreement; thus the power to grant that injunctive rem-
72 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 229 (1962) (dissenting opinion),
76 8 N.Y.2d 133, 168 N.E.2d 377, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1960).
74 Id. at 138, 168 N.E.2d at 379, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 306-07.
75 Id. at 139, 168 N.E.2d at 380, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
76 Id.
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edy may be essential to the uncrippled performance of the Court's
function under § 301Y 7
For this reason, according to Justice Brennan, the conflict between the federal
policy against enjoining strikes and the federal policy of fostering effective
arbitration compels an accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
Labor-Management Relations Act.
On the other hand, the majority in Sinclair read the Norris-LaGuardia
Act prohibition as absolute, stating that "Ial n injunction against work stop-
pages, peaceful picketing or the nonfraudulent encouraging of those activities
would, however, prohibit the precise kinds of conduct which subsections (a),
(e) and (i) of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act unequivocally say cannot be
prohibited." 78 In response, the dissent noted that in the past "the Court has
recognized that Norris-LaGuardia does not invariably bar injunctive relief
when necessary to achieve an important objective of some other statute in the
pattern of labor laws," 79 and cited three cases" brought under the Railway
Labor Act." One of these, Brotherhood of RR. Trainmen v. Chicago River
& Ind. R.R.,82 held that despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act, federal courts
may enjoin strikes over disputes as to the interpretation of. a collective bar-
gaining agreement. The Court concluded that these strikes ignore the obliga-
tion imposed on the union by the Railway Labor Act to settle "minor dis-
putes" by submission to the National Railroad Adjustment Board, rather than
by self-help remedies." The rationale for this conclusion was that establish-
ment of this Board for the settlement of disputes had provided unions with a
reasonable alternative to open economic warfare. 84 If a reasonable alternative
to industrial strife is all that is needed to avoid the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
argued Justice Brennan, then the statute should not apply where the employ-
er's obligation to arbitrate is specifically enforceable. Arbitration would ap-
pear as a reasonable alternative; at least, the parties must have considered it
as such or they would not have put it into the contract.
Justice Brennan, in addition, contended that the availability of the
injunctive remedy in the arbitration setting is far more necessary to the accom-
plishment of the purposes of section 301 than it would be detrimental to those
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Since on a similar argument the Court had
accommodated the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Railway Labor Act in
Chicago River, he felt it should now accommodate the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and section 301. This resolution of the two conflicting policies, he reasoned,
would promote the congressional intent behind both statutes because
77 370 U.S. at 216-17.
78 Id. at 212.
78 Id. at 217.
80 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30
(1957) ; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Virginian
Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
81 45 U.S.C. § 151-88 (1964), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 153, 154 (Supp.
1965-67).
82 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
83 Id. at 39-40.
84 Id. at 41.
85 370 U.S. at 218.
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[ajccommodation requires only that the anti-injunction policy of
Norris-LaGuardia not intrude into areas, not vital to its ends, where
injunctive relief is vital to a purpose of § 301; it does not require
unconditional surrender." (Emphasis added.)
As this passage makes clear, the policy behind the Norris-LaGuardia Act
should be upheld, even in those situations where accommodation is necessary.
The courts should still consider the injunction an extraordinary remedy, and
thus ensure the protection of equity safeguards. Thus, before issuing its order,
the court must
consider whether issuance of an injunction would be warranted under
ordinary principles of equity—whether breaches are occurring and
will continue, or have been threatened and will be committed;
whether they have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the em-
ployer; and whether the employer will suffer more from the denial of
an injunction than will the union from its issuance."
It is submitted that this concern for the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
and for the traditional requirements for the invocation of equity powers, is
equally as important in the situation presented in New Orleans. No justifica-
tion appears for the exercise by a court of its equity jurisdiction without the
application of equity principles, and particularly so in an area where a strong
congressional policy exists against injunction.
This accommodative approach, which would permit injunctions against
strikes in some cases, but only after ordinary principles of equity are satisfied,
recognizes that possibly the grievance and arbitration process cannot com-
pletely supplant economic warfare. 88 Furthermore, if the court views its en-
forcement of an arbitrator's desist order as discretionary, it will be able to
appreciate that a particular situation may be better decided by the parties
involved. Recognition would then be given to the uniqueness of the labor-
management dispute where, unlike usual litigation, after the fact the parties
must bind their wounds and work together. This middle ground also recognizes
that in a particular situation restraining workingmen from striking may be
futile, for, "f e] ven if the workmen obeyed the injunction, it would be possible
and likely that they would perform their services in such a manner as would
not promote the interests of the employers."" Given broad discretion to
decide whether the injunction is appropriate, courts possess the alternatives of
enjoining the strike or not, of awarding money damages, or, as the court did
se Id. at 225 (dissenting opinion).
87 Id. at 228 (dissenting opinion).
88 One commentator has suggested as much. He argues that a strike is more than
a test of strength over a particular issue, noting the drama and excitement of a strike,
the cohesive effect which it can have on union members, and the fact that it is a proving
ground for union leaders. He concludes that "[a] strike substitute, if it is to be a
genuine substitute, must therefore do more than resolve the issue in dispute; it must
also accommodate some of the social and psychological pressures which are associated
with industrial strife." R. Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process 203 (1965).
89 Great N. Ry. v. Brosseau, 286 F. 414, 421 (D.N.D. 1923).
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in Tanker Serv. Comm'n, Inc. v. International Organization of Masters,"
awarding money damages contingent upon the union's refusal to abide by the
arbitrator's decision. In addition, this procedure will, hopefully, preserve and
sustain the policy of Norris-LaGuardia and the traditional safeguards at-
tached to equitable relief:
IV. EXTENSION OF Sinclair
The third alternative open to a court faced with the situation presented
in New Orleans is outright rejection of the result reached in that case on the
ground that the reasoning of Sinclair is equally as compelling here as in the
situation where the injunction is sought prior to arbitration of the dispute."
Since such a rejection of the New Orleans case would close the federal courts
to actions for enforcement, management's efforts may focus on the state courts.
A recent case in the District of Columbia Circuit, United Electrical Workers
v. NLRB," illustrates one such attempt.
The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) had
represented the employees of Star Expansion Industries Corporation (manage-
ment) from 1957 through 1963. In the following year, the United Electrical
Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) ousted IBEW in a close
election and was subsequently certified. The management and the new
bargaining agent, UE, met 38 times between March 23, 1964, and January
13, 1965, in efforts to negotiate a new contract. The three principal UE
demands were: (1) a 20-cent per hour across-the-board wage increase; (2)
a contract term of 2 years; and (3) with some modifications, the retention
from the prior IBEW contract of union security, checkoff, grievance arbitra-
tion, and management rights clauses. Management, because of the narrow
margin of UE's electoral victory, declined to grant union security or checkoff
provisions. It also proposed a one-year contract instead of the suggested two-
year pact, and new provisions for management rights, subcontractors, and
grievance arbitration.°
The grievance arbitration proposal submitted by the management banned
all strikes and lockouts and called for arbitration of any dispute involving the
interpretation or application of the contract. The clause further provided
that the arbitrator could order a forbidden strike or lockout to cease and could
seek judicial enforcement of this order in the state courts of New York." To
99 269 P. Supp. 551 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
91 Even before New Orleans at least one court had already taken this position.
Denying a request for an injunction, the court in Marine Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Curran,
65 L.R.R.M. 2095, 2097 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), said:
In Sinclair the employer sought to enjoin a work stoppage before the arbitration
took place in order to make the arbitration effective. Here the employer seeks
to enjoin a work stoppage after the arbitration has taken place and after the
arbitrator has directed that the work stoppage cease. In my opinion, there is no
significant difference between the two situations, as far as the power of this
court is concerned.
92 409 F.2d 150, 70 L.R.R.M. 2529 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
93 Id. at 151-54, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2529-32.
94 Id. at 154, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2532.
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insure the effectiveness of this last provision, the clause included a waiver by
both parties of any right of removal to the federal courts."
The negotiations were marked by two strikes which apparently resulted
from management's refusal of the UE's union security clause. The strikes
added the problems of rehiring the discharged strikers and the strikers'
vacation pay to the already difficult negotiations. By January the management
and the UE had come to terms on the wage increase, but could not resolve
their differences on the other issues. Negotiations were discontinued and no
collective bargaining agreement was ever signed."
The UE brought a complaint before the National Labor Relations Board.
The Board found the management guilty of certain violations of Sections
8(a) (1) 4'7 and (3)" of the National Labor Relations Act, but dismissed other
portions of the complaint alleging section 8(a) (5)" violations. On appeal to
the circuit court the issues were narrowed to the charges dismissed by the
Board, specifically the alleged violations of section 8(a) (5) as well as other
infractions of 8(a) (1) and (3).
In petitioning the court to review the NLRB order, the UE's central
claim was that the management had violated section 8(a) (5) by bargaining to
an impasse over the proposed arbitration provision. More specifically, the
union contended that the provisions of management's arbitration proposal
allowing for state court injunctions and requiring waiver of the right of
removal were not mandatory bargaining subjects. The union argued further
that these provisions were illegal and unenforceable, first, because they would
withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts in an area governed by federal
law, and secondly, because the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act makes it
inappropriate for state courts, as well as federal courts, to enjoin strikes, 100
Despite these contentions, the court denied the petition and held that provi-
95 Id.
99 Id.
97 Section 8(a) (1) provides that
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964). Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1969), states that
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection....
98 Section 8(a) (3) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. .. ." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964). The Board found that the company's denial of vacation pay
to the strikers was in violation of §§ 8(a) (1) and (3), and required it to be paid.
The Board dismissed UE's contention that the company's stand on vacation pay con-
verted what had begun as an economic strike into an unfair labor practice strike be-
cause the company's refusal to pay prolonged the strike. Also dismissed was UE's charge
of an 8(a) (1) violation on the ground that the company had threatened employees for
supporting the strike. 70 L.R.R.M. at 2530-31 n.4 & n.6.
99 Section 8(a) (5) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. . . ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (5) (1964).
109 409 F.2d at 154-55, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2532.
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sions granting the arbitrator injunctive power and authority to seek state
court enforcement, along with a waiver by the parties of their rights of re-
moval, are essentially part of the arbitration and no-strike proposals. As com-
ponents of such proposals, they are mandatory bargaining subjects.'°'
In arriving at its decision the court noted that an employer can violate
section 8(a) (5) by conditioning his agreement to a contract on acceptance of
a company proposal not within the mandatory subjects of bargaining under
section 8(d). 102
 Grievance arbitration and no-strike clauses, however, are
mandatory subjects for bargaining. Furthermore, the federal policy in regard
to labor law is to foster arbitration. As the Supreme Court indicated in
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., " [c] omplete effec-
tuation of the federal policy is achieved when the agreement contains both
an arbitration provision for all unresolved grievances and an absolute prohibi-
tion of strikes. . . ."'" Therefore, management's provisions describing the
specific manner in which the grievance arbitration and no-strike clause were
to function were mandatory subjects of bargaining.
The UE relied on two cases to support its opposing position. The first of
these, Local 164, Painters v. NLRB," held that a union failed to bargain in
good faith because it insisted to a point of impasse on a proposal which re-
quired an employer to give a performance bond. The Electrical Workers court
distinguished this case on the ground that it had turned on a finding that a
performance bond cannot be considered part of an arbitration scherrie. 105
The court found it more difficult to distinguish the second case, NLRB v.
Dalton Tel. Co.,'" where the court held that a company could not make its
acceptance of a contract conditional upon the union's registration under a
state law so as to make the union an entity amenable to suit in the state court.
By analogy, the decision would seem to be very close to the question at bar.
However, the court noted that in Dalton Telephone the company's insistence
on union registration was construed merely as a ploy to avoid reducing to
writing an agreement to which the parties had already agreed. Furthermore,
"the proposal in Dalton Telephone was again not a means to effectuate an
arbitration clause, but simply a way to insure that the union could be sued
for money damages in a state court." 107
The UE contended also that management had not bargained in good
faith because their arbitration provisions could not be reconciled with national
labor policy. In answering this argument the court emphasized that the ques-
tion was limited to the management's good faith, not to their ability as legal
1 " Id. at 1.56, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2533.
101 Section 8(d) provides:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
103 363 U.S. at 578 n.4.
194 293 F.2d 133, 135 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 ('1961).
105 409 F.2d at 156-57, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2534.
1 °6 187 F.2d 811, 812 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 824 (1951).
1" 409 F.2d at 157, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2534.
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prognosticators. Thus, the test of ultimate enforceability of the provisions was
rejected as too speculative.'" The court pointed out that at the time of the
bargaining
the Company might have reasonably believed that (1) Sinclair
would not be extended to the enforcement of an arbitrator's restrain-
ing order, (2) the Norris-LaGuardia prohibition against injunctions
would not apply to the states, and (3) the federal courts probably
did not have removal jurisdiction over actions brought in state courts
for injunctive relief. 10"
The court thus reserved decision on the validity and enforceability of
the provisions. It noted in passing,"° however, that the Supreme Court had
insured the right of removal in Avco Corp. v. Machinists Aero Lodge 735, 111
but had left open the question of enforcing an arbitrator's strike injunction
by denial of certiorari in the New Orleans case. These decisions, it argued,
proved only that legal speculation as to ultimate enforceability was an unre-
liable test of mandatory bargaining subjects. Rather, the issue was the man-
agement's good faith, and since no grounds existed for questioning good faith,
the decision of the Board would stand.
The particular provisions in dispute in this case are noteworthy because
of the novel powers which they grant the arbitrator. According to the decision
of the Boarc1,112 under management's proposals the arbitrator would be
authorized, upon telephone or telegram request by one side, to issue a tem-
porary order directing the end of any violation of the no-strike, no-lockout
clause. The usual procedure has required the arbitrator to hold a hearing to
decide whether the union's action was a strike, and whether this strike
breached the agreement, before issuance of the desist order. If a court were
subsequently to enforce the arbitrator's temporary order, it would find it
difficult to distinguish Sinclair, for just as in that case, the court would be en-
joining a strike prior to final, binding arbitration. The court in Electrical
Workers pointed out, however, that management
thought to differentiate Sinclair by lodging in the arbitrator, and not
in itself, the power to decide when to seek judicial relief against the
breach of the no-strike clause, thereby making it the neutral, and
not a party to the labor dispute, who is the suitor for the injunc-
tion.113
It is difficult to understand how the arbitrator would have standing to
sue for enforcement unless he has somehow been made a party to the agree-
ment. Furthermore, if he has realistically been made a party to the contract,
then it would seem to follow that he is also a party to the labor dispute. The
ins Id. at 159, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2536.
1" Id., 70 L.R.R.M. at 2535.
110 Id.
111 390 U.S. 557 (1968). The Court held that an action brought in a state court to
enjoin a breach of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement in an industry
affecting interstate commerce is removable to a federal district court.
112 164 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 65 L.R.R.M. 1127 (1967).
113 409 F.2d at 158, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2535.
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validity, however, of this provision, as well as that providing for waiver of
the right of removal, is, as the court stated, an open question. If the waiver
of removal were to be held valid the problem rendered academic by Avco
would be resurrected, that is, whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act is substantive
and therefore part of the federal labor law which state courts must administer
in labor disputes.
In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,114
 the Supreme Court ruled that
federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over disputes involving
the breach of a collective bargaining agreement. In the same year, the Court
stated in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. 1 t 5
 that in deciding collec-
tive bargaining agreement suits the state courts must apply federal substantive
law in order to insure uniformity throughout the judicial system. The question
remains, however, whether a state court, in a suit to enjoin a strike, must
recognize the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
A number of state courts have disavowed the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
granted injunctions against strikes."° The best known of these decisions is
that of Justice Traynor in McCarroll v. District Council of Carpenters," 7
where the California Supreme Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does
not bar a state court from enjoining strikes in breach of collective bargaining
agreements. Other state courts have rejected Justice Traynor's approach and
adhered to the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 118
 In Independent
Oil Workers v. Socony Mobil Oil Co.,119
 the New Jersey Superior Court, deny-
ing an injunction, declared that " [t] he Norris-LaGuardia Act is certainly
part of the federal labor policy and as such must get primary consideration
in any suit for an injunction under section 301 [of the Labor-Management
Relations Act] ."120
 This view appears to transcend the question whether
the Norris-LaGuardia Act is substantive and seemingly accepts the premise
that even if the Act is jurisdictional, it expresses a federal policy in this area
requiring recognition by state courts.
These two divergent state court opinions illustrate one of the problems
raised by acceptance of the waiver of the right of removal suggested in
Electrical lVorkers. The difficulty is, of course, the lack of uniformity which
will arise in the area of federal labor law. 121 Beyond this, however, lies a more
subtle problem. State courts which have enjoined strikes in the past have
avoided the Norris-LaGuardia Act essentially by grounding their decisions on
114 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
115 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
118 See, e.g., Radio Corp. of America v. Local 780, Theatrical Stage Employees, 160
So. 2d 150 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 169 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1964); C.D. Perry & Sons, Inc.
v. Robilotto, 39 Misc. 2d 147, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1963), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d
949, 260 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1965) ; Shaw Elec. Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 98, 418 Pa. 1,
208 A.2d 709 (1965).
117 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cart, denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
118
 See, e.g., Independent Oil Workers v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 85 N.J. Super. 453,
205 A.2d 78 (Ch. 1964) ; . Tidewater Express Lines v. Freight Drivers Local 557, 230 Md.
450, 187 A.2d 685 (1963).
119 85 N.J. Super. 453, 205 A.2d 78 (Ch. 1964).
120 Id. at 460, 205 A.2d at 82.
.	 121 "More important, the subject matter of § 301 (a) is 'peculiarly one that calls for
uniform law.' " Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
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inherent jurisdiction over the matter as a question of pure contract law.' 22
This view of collective bargaining disputes as contract questions bodes ill for
the future. As seen in the discussion of New Orleans, such an approach leads
to injunctive relief without the traditional equity safeguards. Consequently,
the route for circumvention of the Norris-LaGuardia Act suggested by the
Electrical Workers case is equally as offensive as the approach of the New
Orleans court. The undesirability of these alternatives seems to strengthen
the case for the accommodative middle ground of Justice Brennan.
V. CoNcLusioN
The crux of the apparent conflict between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
the federal policy favoring arbitration is whether enforcement of arbitrators'
desist orders is necessary for effective arbitration. In Sinclair the Court avoided
the question by the postulate that regardless of the need for enforcement, Con-
gress has decided that such enforcement is impermissible. This conclusion
should be re-examined. The dissent of Justice Brennan in Sinclair indicates
that the absolutist approach to the Norris-LaGuardia Act taken by the ma-
jority was inconsistent with past decisions of the Court which accommodated
the Act with the Railway Labor Act. If there has been an accommodation of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the past, the congressional intent behind the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, as well as the meaning of congressional inactivity
since its enactment, is not as explicit or fixed as the majority in Sinclair has
suggested. It can be argued that Congress is leaving to the courts the resolu-
tion of the conflict between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the policy favoring
arbitration. If this is so, then the Supreme Court should formulate a solution,
as the New Orleans court attempted to do. The New Orleans case provides
additional motivation for the Court to act. For just as the literal interpreta-
tion of Sinclair is deceptively simple, so also is New Orleans' rule of case,
enjoining a strike whenever the arbitrator orders it. The middle ground be-
tween Sinclair and New Orleans emerges as the firmest because, recognizing
that enforcement may be necessary and permissible in some cases, it preserves
to the courts sufficient review of the arbitration to insure that the traditional
equity safeguards are met before it orders this extraordinary relief.
The New Orleans case, however, and particularly the collective bargain-
ing agreement involved there, serves to point up the sophistication of the
arbitration system and collective bargaining agreements. Labor and manage-
ment had there established a responsive, viable private judicial system lacking
only the power of enforcement (which would seem necessary in only the rare
case) 1=' 3 To preserve the level of mature self-government attained thus far
by labor and management, judicial enforcement of arbitrators' decrees may
be necessary, provided of course that equity safeguards are considered.
The Electrical Workers case also evidences the sophistication of modern
collective bargaining agreements. However, as is apparent from the provisions
involved, management is still attempting to reach its long-standing goal of
122 See Spelfogel, Enforcement of No-Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Actions
and Discipline, 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 239, 242 (1966).
12 ' 3 F. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works '10 (1952) ; Rice, A Paradox of Our National
Labor Law, 34 Marg. L. Rev. 233, 237 (1951).
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no strikes. By ruling that management's proposals were mandatory bargaining
subjects, the Board and the court in the Electrical Workers case indicated
that they consider management's desire reasonable. The provisions submitted
by management, particularly the waiver of the right of removal, amount to all
but a waiver of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. If a union were to accept these
provisions it would seem to be acknowledging that a union does not need
the protection of the Norris-LaGuardia Act if it has the "reasonable alterna,
tive" of arbitration and the traditional protection of an equity court's self-
restraint. At the risk of reading too much into the decision, it is submitted that
both the Board and the court were admitting that in a situation where the
union is protected by an agreement to arbitrate, the union does not need the
shelter of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Because the result of each leads to injunctive relief against strikes in
breach of collective bargaining agreements, both the Electrical Workers and
the New Orleans cases may well cause a re-evaluation of the no-strike pledge.
A real, enforceable surrender of the right to strike will introduce a new
bargaining area which should indicate the value of a no-strike clause to labor
and management, and whether arbitration is an acceptable alternative to the
protection of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
A second contract provision which may be subject to special scrutiny
is that conferring injunctive power on the arbitrator. In its decision, the New
Orleans court relied heavily on this explicit grant of authority. In the past
unions have been protected by the bar of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and by
the fact that arbitrators' orders are not self-enforcing, but decisions such as
New Orleans, which lead to automatic court enforcement, may cause unions to
have second thoughts about the conferral of such authority in the future.
In addition, by emphasis of the express power of the arbitrator to issue a
desist order the New Orleans decision has left open the question whether this
power can be inferred from the agreement. Arguably it should be implied, since
in every other situation the arbitrator is given free rein to fashion an appro-
priate remedy. Such a conclusion seems justified on the ground that arbitra,
tion is remedial, not merely fact-finding, in nature, and many situations would
seem to require a desist order to remedy the breach effectively. Very possibly the
Supreme Court is waiting for such a case where the arbitrator has enjoined
the violation of a no-strike clause on the basis of his general remedial powers
before it decides whether arbitrators' injunctions can be enforced. Until the
Court does resolve this question, and the concomitant issue whether express
power is necessary, the law is settled in at least one circuit that if they
originate from expressly given injunctive power, arbitrators' desist orders are
enforceable.
ANDREW J. MCELANEY, JR.
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